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A GENUINE MARKER OF THE
AUTOMATICITY OF READING IN THE
STROOP TASK
For the past four decades or so, an idea
contrasting early definitions of automatic-
ity and claiming that automatic processes
can be controlled, has dominated the lit-
erature (Logan, 1980, 1985; Norman and
Shallice, 1986; Tzelgov et al., 1990). The
interference effect found in the Stroop task
is usually considered to be a marker of
automaticity of reading, while the modu-
lation of its magnitude is referred to as a
marker of control. In the present article,
we emphasize the frequently overlooked
notion that what we refer to as a marker
of automaticity has in fact multiple ori-
gins.MacLeod andMacDonald (2000) and
Goldfarb and Henik (2007) suggested that
two types of conflict—the task and infor-
mational conflicts—contribute to Stroop
interference. The informational conflict
(henceforth IC) represents competition
between two color concepts: one that is
activated through color naming and the
second that is activated by the reading pro-
cess (e.g., the concepts red and blue respec-
tively, when the stimulus is the word BLUE
written in red ink). However, according
to the same authors, some amount of
interference is obtained even with color-
unrelated words, since all words automat-
ically activate the irrelevant reading task,
setting in motion the competition between
two possible tasks (henceforth task con-
flict; TC) (see Kalanthroff et al., 2013a;
Entel et al., submitted, for behavioral evi-
dence, and Bench et al., 1993; Carter et al.,
1995, for neuroimaging evidence of the
TC). Even non-word stimuli containing
lexical information (e.g., letter strings) can
interfere because they are readable (Klein,
1964; Sharma and McKenna, 1998). The
more word-like the stimulus, the more
interference it produces (Monsell et al.,
2001). Thus, as evident from this distinc-
tion, the genuine marker of automaticity is
the TC whereas the IC amplifies the inter-
ference from the irrelevant task. That is,
in order to argue that the automatic read-
ing process can be controlled one should
actually show that what is controlled is
the TC.
LIST-WIDE PROPORTION CONGRUENT
EFFECT AND THE CONFLICT
ADAPTATION ACCOUNT
The more frequent the incongruent tri-
als are in an experiment, the smaller the
Stroop effect (Logan and Zbrodoff, 1979;
Logan, 1980; Tzelgov et al., 1992). This
is known as the list-wide proportion con-
gruent effect because the proportions are
manipulated at the list level. The list-
wide proportion congruent effect is con-
sidered to be a marker of control since it
demonstrates the modulation of the mag-
nitude of the Stroop effect, and as such,
is interpreted in terms of conflict adapta-
tion. According to the conflict-monitoring
framework (Botvinick et al., 2001; De
Pisapia and Braver, 2006; Braver, 2012), an
increased proportion of incongruent trials
results in higher conflict at the response
level, which triggers the control system.
The control process includes two stages:
conflict detection and control exertion.
Referring to our previous discussion, in
order to claim the automatic reading pro-
cess can be controlled, the TC should
be the target of both stages of the con-
trol process. However, according to our
analysis, this is not the case. In fact, the
TC is only a target of the control exer-
tion stage. According to the models within
the conflict-monitoring framework, con-
flict reduction is achieved through adjust-
ing the weights of the two tasks, thereby
minimizing the TC. However, the conflict
detection stage is centered on response
competition, which requires the TC to be
amplified by the IC. When there is no
IC, that is, no competing color-concept
activation by reading, no competing color-
response can be activated. Focusing on
response competition (and thereby on IC)
by Botvinick et al. and later models (De
Pisapia and Braver, 2006; Blais et al., 2007;
see also Verguts and Notebaert, 2008, for
a model integrating cognitive control and
reinforcement learning) leads to the con-
clusion that the detection of conflict, and
therefore triggering of the entire control
process, requires the IC being present (see
Kalanthroff et al., 2013b, for evidence
inconsistent with this assumption). There
is no “path” in these architectures allowing
TC to be monitored without the presence
of the IC (Figure 1). That is, the theory
behind these architectures in their current
state does not allow an unequivocal claim




ADAPTATION VS. LEARNING ACCOUNT
The conflict adaptation account has been
challenged by manipulating the propor-
tions of incongruent trials at the item level,
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FIGURE 1 | The proposed architectures within the conflict-monitoring
framework. (A) All models share the same core architecture introduced by
Cohen et al. (1990) in their explanation of Stroop effect performance. This
includes the definition of conflict as response competition, implying an
aggregated contribution of task conflict and informational conflict. The
assumption that conflict is controlled solely by adjustment of task
representation weights implies that only the task conflict can be directly
controlled. (B) Botvinick et al.’s (2001, 2004) model added a
conflict-monitoring unit thereby generating a control loop for adjusting the
task representation weights, while (C) Blais et al. (2007) proposed that task
weights can be adjusted differentially for specific items. (D) De Pisapia and
Braver’s (2006) architecture captures the distinction between reactive and
proactive control. (E) Verguts and Notebaert’s (2008, 2009) model suggests
control is modulated through conflict-based Hebbian learning. Note the
models are depicted in a very schematic way, with no reference to the nature
and direction of the existed connections, their specific weights, etc. The
detailed information can be found in the original articles (see references). R,
red; G, green; C, color; W, word; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; LC, locus
coeruleus; MFC, medial frontal cortex; PFC, prefrontal cortex; DLPFC,
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
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revealing an item-specific proportion con-
gruent effect (Jacoby et al., 1999, 2003). In
the item-specific paradigm, list-wide pro-
portion congruence is held at 50%, and
specific words are paired in most of the
trials with a specific color, creating mostly
congruent (i.e., not associated with con-
flict) or mostly incongruent (i.e., strongly
associated with conflict) stimuli. The item-
specific proportion congruent effect refers
to a smaller interference for mostly incon-
gruent items than for mostly congruent
items.
In order to determine whether a
word causes conflict, the word should
be read, which contradicts the main
assumption of the models in the conflict-
monitoring literature, including those
specifically adapted to explain the item-
specific findings (Blais et al., 2007), that
control operates proactively to prevent
the initiation of the reading process.
Consequently, it has been proposed (Bugg
et al., 2008, 2011), and supported by
empirical data (Bugg andHutchison, 2012;
Abrahamse et al., 2013), that item-specific
control may be based on reactive control.
This idea, however, is inconsistent with
the assumption that reading, as an auto-
matic process, is ballistic (Bargh, 1989),
that is, difficult to stop once started.
Stopping a ballistic reading process seems
especially unlikely given that it is com-
pleted extremely quickly (Sereno et al.,
1998; Cohen et al., 2000; Pulvermuller
et al., 2001). More important, as the previ-
ous section illustrates, the conflict adapta-
tion account can only explain the pattern
obtained for incongruent (i.e., produc-
ing IC) items in mostly incongruent and
mostly congruent conditions. However,
manipulating the proportions at the item
level seems also to affect the congruent
(i.e., producing no IC) items, as evidenced
(in our view) by the results of Jacoby et al.
(2003). In that study, a 50/50 condition
in which the number of presentations of
words in each color was equal for congru-
ent or incongruent stimuli was included
in addition to the mostly congruent and
mostly incongruent conditions. The anal-
ysis carried out by the authors showed
that the larger the proportion of incon-
gruent items was (from mostly congru-
ent to 50/50 to mostly incongruent), the
lesser the Stroop effect obtained. However,
the 50/50 condition can be defined not
just as a condition including more incon-
gruent items than the mostly congruent
condition, but also as a neutral condi-
tion where the conflict cannot be pre-
dicted by reading. Jacoby et al.’s data
reveal that in comparison to the “neu-
tral” (50/50) condition, incongruent items
in the mostly incongruent condition were
32ms faster. Similarly, and surprisingly,
congruent items in the mostly congruent
condition also showed a 21ms reaction
time (RT) reduction. Identical informa-
tion regarding the conflict is provided by
reading congruent words in the 50/50 and
mostly congruent conditions, and yet RT
in the latter condition is faster. This pat-
tern contradicts the conflict adaptation
account since congruent items do not pro-
duce IC, which according to our analysis, is
the basis for control modulation. Schmidt
et al. (2007; Schmidt and Besner, 2008)
proposed a contingency learning account to
explain Jacoby et al.’s (2003) finding with-
out assuming conflict adaptation. It pos-
tulates that pairing a word with a specific
color creates an association between that
word and a specific response. The mech-
anism of contingency learning functions
by lowering the threshold of the most fre-
quently encountered response to the word,
and does not lower the thresholds of other
possible responses. Since according to the
contingency learning account it does not
matter if the word is paired mostly with
congruent or incongruent colors, the facil-
itative effect of learning predicted by the
contingency learning account is consistent
with the results of Jacoby et al. (2003).
To prove the independence of the con-
tingency learning mechanism of conflict,
Schmidt and Besner (2008) demonstrated
that the effects of contingency learning and
congruency (i.e., IC) are additive by rean-
alyzing Jacoby et al.’s (2003) data. This
evidence, however, is somewhat problem-
atic because the rearrangement of the cells
in the design manipulating proportion
congruency still has the (congruency) con-
found, and the effect of contingency learn-
ing cannot be validly evaluated in such an
analysis. In order to test directly whether
contingency learning depends on the pres-
ence of conflict, Schmidt et al. (2007) (also
Schmidt and Besner, 2008) conducted an
experiment in which they eliminated IC by
using neutral (i.e., color-unrelated) words
only as stimuli in a color naming task.
Their results demonstrated that the con-
tingency learning effect does not require
a stimulus to be a color-related (i.e., con-
flicting) word, supporting the idea that
contingency learning is independent of the
presence of IC. However, as suggested by
MacLeod and MacDonald (2000), even
neutral words are conflicting with respect
to TC. Thus, the contingency learning
effect might be independent of IC, but not
of TC. Although such dependency would
not weaken the ability of the contingency
learning to explain the item-specific pro-
portion congruent effect, it would suggest
that this account might actually represent
another control-like adaptive mechanism
activated by (task) conflict. In fact, such
evidence would dissipate the core contro-
versy (i.e., control vs. learning) around the
interpretation of the conflict adaptation
effect, by incorporating the contingency
learning into the category of control mech-
anisms.
Another potential problem with the
contingency learning account is that it
assumes that the association learned refers
to a particular response in the sense of
the button that should be pushed, but
not in the sense of the correct color.
This claim, supported by the results of
their Experiment 4, is explicitly stated
by Schmidt et al. (2007): “. . . pairings
of stimuli do not simply form semantic
connections. . . but instead directly cause
changes in our behavior . . .” It is also
evident in the architecture of the pro-
posed parallel episodic processing (PEP)
model (Schmidt, 2013) where the response
generation layer consists of representa-
tions of the buttons the responses are
mapped to, but not of the response set
colors. If so, then it posits the questions
of what would happen, and how contin-
gency learning would express itself when
instead of pushing the keys on a keyboard,
responses are made vocally. When the
response requires naming the color, there
is no other way contingency learning can
proceed but through linking the word with
a specific color-concept because the latter
is necessary for making a verbal response.
That is, with vocal responses, contingency
learning is predicted to affect the informa-
tional and not the response level of repre-
sentations. However, if the words already
have a strong semantic association with the
color concept (i.e., congruent condition)
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then the contribution of the contingency
learning process should be minimal, if at
all. Therefore, with respect to the current
discussion, the congruency of the item,
or in other words, informational conflict
or its absence, in some situations, might
matter even for the contingency learning
process.
SUMMARY
We do not pretend that the distinction
between task and information conflict
can solve the ongoing argument regard-
ing the mechanism behind the “flexibil-
ity” of the Stroop effect, as reflected by
the proportion effect. We do believe that
the awareness of the fact that only one
of two components contributing to the
Stroop effect is a genuine marker of the
automaticity of reading, would undoubt-
edly help in further developing existing
control models, and probably new ones,
that would be able to answer the ques-
tion regarding controllability of reading.
Distinguishing between two types of con-
flict can also be valuable with respect to
the “control vs. learning” debate. For now,
the proposed learning mechanism (i.e.,
contingency learning), as an alternative
explanation for some of the proportion
congruent effects, has only been proven
to be independent from the IC. However,
as mentioned, the TC is what really mat-
ters. Hence, in order to be considered as an
independently standing mechanism that is
not part of the control system, the con-
tingency learning should also be evident
when no TC is produced by stimuli.
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